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THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE - SB 122
RICHAED COSWAY* and WARREN L. SHATTUCK**
Senate Bill 122, enacting the Uniform Commercial Code in Washing-
ton, was passed during the recent legislative session. The effective date
of the new statute is June 30, 1967.
Since 1952, when the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited
as UCC] was first proposed by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute, it has
been enacted by forty-one states, the District of Columbia, and the
Virgin Islands. It is now much easier to list the-states which have not
enacted it. These are: Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Idaho, Louisiana,
Mississippi, South Dakota, South Carolina, and Vermont.
As this modern replacement for the older uniform commercial laws'
and for the hodge-podge of anachronisms which constituted the pre-
Code law of personal property security' was adopted across the country,
Washington became an isolated area of commercial law obsolescence.
We were still trying to carry on jet-age commerce with horse-and-
buggy law-with nineteenth century sales and negotiable instruments
principles, with warehouse receipts and bills of lading statutes prepared
some sixty years ago, with no determinable legal system for a multi-
million dollar letter of credit business, and with a jerry-built complex of
secured-transactions law. The 1965 Washington legislature is to be
commended for once again bringing this state into the mainstream of
American commercial law.
The UCC modernizes and improves the substantive principles of
commercial law. It is also the most comprehensive of the long series
of uniform laws which have been prepared by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform Laws, and seems likely to be the most
successful. The struggle for uniformity in the commercial law of the
states, which began in 1895 with the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Act, has been to a considerable degree complicated by divergent judicial
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
** Professor of Law, University of Washington.
Replaced are: The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, the Uniform Sales Act,
the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, and the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. Also replaced is the Bank
Collection Code.2 Replaced are the various statutes having to do with chattel mortgages, conditional
sales and assignments of accounts receivable. Also replaced, with a more comprehen-
sive coverage of the area, is the bulk sales statute.
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construction. The Uniform Commercial Code affords few opportunities
for bona fide dispute about the meaning of its language. Most impor-
tant, it may be expected that modern judges, being fully aware of
the importance of uniform operation of such a statute, will achieve
uniformity in construction.
Much of the new statute has been discussed in previous issues of the
Washington Law Review,' and in Comments for the State of Washing-
ton.' No attempt will therefore be made in this note to undertake a
general discussion of substantive details. Our discussion will be limited
to some new developments.
In enacting the UCC the Washington legislature departed at several
points from the official text of the statute as proposed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Familiarity with
these changes will be important not only to Washington lawyers and
their clients, but also to businessmen and their legal counsel all over
the country. As forms and operating procedures are devised for use in
inter-state commercial transactions, each intra-state aberration is a
point of friction and risk which must be carefully noted.
I. ARTICLE 1 - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1-208
The official text of this section reads:
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest may
accelerate payment or performance or require collateral or additional
collateral "at will" or "when he deems himself insecure" or in words of
similar import shall be construed to mean that he shall have power to do
so only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or per-
3 A general summary of the statute and its background appears in Shattuck, The
Uniform Commercial Code-A Modernization of Commercial Law, 35 WASH. L. Ray.
398 (1960).
Sales are discussed in: Johnson, Sales-A Comparison of the Law in Washington
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 34 WASH. L. REv. 78 (1959) ; Cosway, Sales-A
Comparison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 WASH.
L. RE V. 412, 617 (1960), 36 WASH. L. Rv. 50, 440 (1961).
Commercial paper, i.e., negotiable instruments, are discussed in Cosway, Negotiable
Instruments-A Comparison of Washington Law and Uniform Commercial Code
Article 3,38 WAsH. L. REv. 501, 719 (1963), 40 WASH. L. Rav. 281 (1965).
Letters of Credit are discussed in Shattuck & Guernsey, Letters of Credit-A Con-
parison of Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Washington Practice,
37 WASH. L. REv. 325, 500 (1962).
Secured transactions are discussed in Shattuck, Secured Transactions (Other than
Real Estate Mortgages)-A Comparison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform
Commercial Code, Article 9, 29 WASH. L. REV. 1, 195, 263 (1954).
Published in 1962, this book contains not only the Official Comments to the Uni-
form Commercial Code, but also a section-by-section comparison of the entire statute
with the Washington law as it was then, several cross-reference tables, and a very
useful index.
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formance is impaired. The burden of establishing lack of good faith is on
the party against whom the power has been exercised.
As enacted in Washington, this section does not contain the conclud-
ing sentence of the official text. In deleting the statement that the
burden would be on the debtor, obligor or other person against whom
the power to accelerate is operative to disprove good faith, the legisla-
ture evidently assumes that the burden will be on the creditor, obligee
or other holder of the power to accelerate to prove his good faith.
II. ARTICLE 2 - SALES
The first departure from the official text of Article 2 occurs in section
2-616. This section spells out the rights of the buyer on learning of an
excusable delay on the seller's part. In essence, the buyer has the right
to terminate the contract, either with respect to the particular delivery
or, in some cases, with respect to the entire contract. Alternatively, the
buyer may modify the contract, but unless he acts within thirty days
after receipt of notice that there will be a delay, he is deemed to have
terminated the contract.
This policy borrows from the contract principle of prospective failure
of consideration, adding details implementing that policy. One detail,
eliminated from the Washington version, is subsection (3) which
provides:
The provisions of this section may not be negated by agreement except
in so far as the seller has assumed a greater obligation under the preceding
section.
The major effect of this subsection would be found in the very types of
commercial arrangements where common understanding is probably to
the contrary. That is to say, the impact of the subsection will not be
significant in contracts with consumers, but will be of major importance
in very large contracts between commercial firms where specially built
products are involved. Such firms are usually free to bargain for some
delay, and they are also free to allocate losses, such as those incurred in
developmental expenses, in the event of contract termination.
The veto message of the Governor reflects dissatisfaction with the
Code's departure from custom, suggesting that matters in this area
ought best be left to arms-length bargaining, as it has been historically.
Thus, this subsection is eliminated from our version of the Code.
Wisconsin has also eliminated it.
1965]
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A second departure in Article 2 occurs in section 2-706 which gives
the seller the power of resale on breach by the buyer. The Washington
legislature amended this section by adding a seventh paragraph:
Any sale made hereunder, if a loss has been sustained, in order to
charge the purchaser for the loss, the seller must have exerted a reason-
able effort to obtain the fair market price of the said goods sold.
This paragraph seems to be designed to protect buyers from over-
reaching by sellers who dispose of the goods through devices not likely
to bring a fair return, an aim which is totally unobjectionable. How-
ever, the difficulty is that essentially the same restrictions are stated in
subsection (1) of the section:
Under the conditions stated in Section 2-703 on seller's remedies, the
seller may resell the goods concerned or the undelivered balance thereof.
Where the resale is made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable
manner the seller may recover the difference between the resale price and
the contract price together with any incidental damages allowed under
the provisions of this Article (Section 2-710), but less expenses saved in
consequence of the buyer's breach. (Emphasis added.)
The necessary inference from this wording is that unless the seller does
act in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner he may not
recover the difference between resale and contract prices. Thus, sub-
section (7) seems unnecessary, and its presence leads one to ask why it
was inserted, and what will be its effect.
One may quickly dispense with the words "exerted a reasonable effort
to obtain the fair market price," because they do not appear to add
anything not already implicit in the basic requirement of commercial
good faith found in the original version and in subsection (1). Any
commercially reasonable sale would seem directed to obtaining an
approximation of the fair market price, thus no new element is added.
The safest and most reasonable conclusion, therefore, is that sub-
section (7) spells out the inference left inarticulate in subsection (1),
and thus has no real effect. There is, however, some danger that more
will be read into subsection (7), because this subsection may suggest
that unless the resale is commercially reasonable the seller is without
any remedy. This is surely not what was intended and not what is
encompassed in subsection (1), for the only sanction against the seller
is that he may not rely on the resale price as setting the amount of his
damage. If the resale is not a fair one--i.e., one not designed to bring
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in a return approximating the market price-the seller must turn to
another measure of damage, namely the difference between the market
price and the contract price. The advantage he gains by compliance
with section 2-706 is that his resale, if proper, determines the "market
price" in the formula. He loses that advantage if the sale is not proper,
and thus he must prove his damage under section 2-708.
III. ARTICLE 3- CommrgCIAL PAPER
Article 3 seems to have been enacted without alteration.
IV. ARTICLE 4 - BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
The only modification found in article 4 occurs in section 4-406,
subsection (4). This section sets out the duties of the customer of a
bank (i.e., the drawer of checks) on return of his statement of account.
Subsection (4) states a time limit within which the customer must act if
he is to hold the bank responsible for payment out on checks on which
his name (as drawer) was forged, on which there is an alteration, or on
which there is a forged indorsement. With respect to a forged indorse-
ment, the time limit is three years, but with respect to the other two,
the time limit in Washington is sixty days, while in the official text the
time limit is one year. What Washington has done, in short, is to retain
the time limit stated in a previous statute, Washington Revised Code
30.16.020.
V. ARTICLE 5- LErrTEs OF CREDIT
Washington adopted the official version of article 5.
VI. ARTICLE 6 - BULx TRANSFERS
In Washington, section 6-102 (2) reads:
A transfer of all or substantially all of the equipment (Section 9-109)
of such an enterprise is a bulk transfer whether or not made in connection
with a bulk transfer of inventory, merchandise, materials or supplies.
(Emphasis added.)
In the official text version, however, a transfer of equipment is a bulk
transfer only if made in connection with a bulk transfer of inventory,
merchandise, materials or supplies. The significance and effect of the
change are obvious.
Section 6-104(1) (c) is modified in Washington in two respects. The
Washington version provides:
Except as provided with respect to auction sales (Section 6-108), a
1965]
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bulk transfer subject to this Article is ineffective against any creditor of
the transferor unless...
The transferee preserves the list and schedule for six months next
following the transfer and permits inspection of either or both and copy-
ing therefrom at all reasonable hours by any creditor of the transferor,
and files the list and schedule in the office of the county auditor of the
county in which the property transferred is located and serves it upon
the office of the state tax commission; the list and schedule shall be
indexed as chattel mortgages are indexed, the name of the vendor being
indexed as mortgagor and the name of the intending purchaser as mort-
gagee. (Emphasis added.)
The italicized words demonstrate the Washington modifications. In
the original version of the Code, the transferee has the option of pre-
serving the list and schedule or filing it, while in Washington both are
required. The last portion of the underscored words preserves details
formerly required by the Washington bulk sales statutes with respect
to filing with the tax commission and with respect to details of index-
ing. The reference to indexing of chattel mortgages seems to be an
anachronism in view of the Code's generalized treatment of security
agreements.
Subsection (3) of section 6-107 is also modified in Washington to
include a provision for protection of the state tax commission, and to
require filing of the notice. The words which have been added in Wash-
ington are italicized in the following quotation:
(3) The notice in any case shall be delivered personally or sent by
registered or certified mail to all the persons shown on the list of creditors
furnished by the transferor (Section 6-104), to all other persons who are
known to the transferee to hold or assert claims against the transferor,
and to the office of the state tax commission. A copy of the notice shall be
filed in the office of the county auditor of the county in which the property
transferred is located and indexed as chattel mortgages are indexed, the
name of the vendor being indexed as mortgagor and the name of the
intending purchaser as mortgagee.
VII. ARTICLE 7 - WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS, BILLS OF LADING
AND OTHER DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
Article 7 appears to have been acted without change in the official
text.
VIII. ARTICLE 8 - INVESTMENT SECURITIES
Article 8 appears to have been enacted without change in the official
text.
[VOL. 40 :873
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IX. ARTICLE 9
SECURED TRANSACTIONS; SALES OF ACCOUNTS,
CONTRACT RIGHTS AND CHATTEL PAPER
A. The Background.
Before examining the changes made by the Washington legislature
in article 9 of the UCC, and the governor's veto of some of those
changes, it may be helpful to consider both the commercial importance
of article 9 and the particular need for uniformity in the area it covers.
The UCC is a statute designed for enactment in all of the fifty states
and in the District of Columbia. If it were enacted in all of these
jurisdictions, without local deviations, this country would have for the
first time a truly national commercial law. That a nation-wide legal
system for the governance of business transactions is badly needed
seems obvious. Trade of all kinds pays little heed to political sub-
divisions. The prosperity of Washington is vitally dependent on our
ability to find customers elsewhere and to import the things we need.
We are part of a complicated network of interstate activity, much
affected by both the law and the commercial well-being of our neigh-
bors.
Business cannot flourish in an unfavorable legal environment. A
favorable legal environment is a composite of two elements-the sub-
stantive principles, and freedom from the traps, risks and costs which
businessmen encounter if the law under which they must operate varies
from state to state. Article 9 should accordingly be measured both in
terms of its substantive coverage, and also as part of a proposed
national law. The latter goal is near to attainment, as enactment of
the UCC by all of the states now seems likely. If legislatures in enact-
ing the statute will resist pressure for the introduction of variations
favoring a local group, a major contribution to the future economic
welfare of the country will have been made.
That part of commerce which consists of credit secured by personal
property is only to a degree less national than are the movements of
goods and commercial paper. The national total of such financing is
very large-approximately one hundred billion dollars.' Still more
billions are involved in sales of accounts and chattel paper.
5 Mr. Robert Coleman, Assistant Vice-President, Seattle-First National Bank, esti-
mates consumer credit at about sixty-two billions, bank loans to brokers and bank loans
to customers secured by stocks and bonds at about seven billions, industrial and com-
mercial loans at about fifty-five billions of which half or a little less than half are
thought to be secured by personal property, and miscellaneous bank loans secured by
personal property at about five billions.
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Equally significant is the fact that the velocity of trade and the total
volume of sales at all levels-retail, wholesale and manufacturing-
would drop drastically were it not for secured credit. The prosperity
of all of us, including the prosperity of those who extend unsecured
credit, is tightly interwoven with the availability of secured credit to
consumers, merchants and manufacturers. Much of that credit can
be secured only by personal property.
This state, no less than any other, is vitally concerned with both
aspects of the secured transactions sections of the UCC-the substan-
tive details which would clarify and simplify the complex of mortgage,
pledge, conditional sale and trust receipt which is the present Wash-
ington law, and with the opportunity afforded by the UCC to join with
the other forty-nine states and the District of Columbia in an endeavor
to create a national law for secured transactions.
'The fact that a few other states, notably California, have been moti-
vated to impose local considerations on article 9 and thus to frustrate
to that extent a major objective of the statute only emphasizes the
folly of such a course.
Concerning the substantive details of UCC article 9, it will be useful
to remember that the drafting and re-drafting which produced the bill
introduced in the Washington legislature extended over nearly twenty
years prior to completion of the final draft in 1962, that the statute
had been scrutinized by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, by the American Law Institute, by the New York
Revision Commission, and by numerous other legislative, bar asso-
ciation and trade association study groups, and that the statute is a
tightly integrated whole.
B. The Washington amendments.
Section 9-206(1)
The official text of this subsection reads:
(1) Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different
rule for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or
lessee that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense
which he may have against the seller or lessor is enforceable by an
assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without
notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may be
asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under
the Article on Commercial Paper (Article 3). A buyer who as part of
one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agree-
ment makes such an agreement.
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The final sentence of the subsection was deleted by amendment.
The following sentence was added by amendment: "Provided, That
nothing in this act may be construed as depriving a buyer, as against
an assignee, of asserting the defenses of fraud or material misrepre-
sentation by the seller." This sentence was vetoed. The governor's
veto message pointed out the fact that Washington Revised Code
63.14.150 amply protects consumers against waivers of defenses, in-
cluding those based on fraud or material misrepresentation, and the
fact that the amendment created doubt about the status of a nego-
tiable instrument in the hands of a holder in due course.
The end result of amendment and veto is the official text of the sub-
section without the concluding sentence. The absence of this sentence
should make no substantial difference in the operation of the subsec-
tion. General principles of negotiability which come into play when-
ever a debtor signs a negotiable note will cut off certain defenses if
the instrument comes into the hands of a holder in due course, whether
or not the note is secured. The interest of a secured party in collateral
is measured by his rights under the secured note.6
Section 9-208
The official text of this section reads:
(1) A debtor may sign a statement indicating what he believes to be
the aggregate amount of unpaid indebtedness as of a specified date and
may send it to the secured party with a request that the statement be
approved or corrected and returned to the debtor. When the security
agreement or any other record kept by the secured party identifies the
collateral a debtor may similarly request the secured party to approve or
correct a list of the collateral.
(2) The secured party must comply with such a request within two
weeks after receipt by sending a written correction or approval. If the
secured party claims a security interest in all of a particular type of collat-
eral owned by the debtor he may indicate that fact in his reply and need
not approve or correct an itemized list of such collateral. If the secured
party without reasonable excuse fails to comply he is liable for any loss
caused to the debtor thereby; and if the debtor has properly included in
his request a good faith statement of the obligation or a list of the collat-
eral or both the secured party may claim a security interest only as shown
in the statement against persons misled by his failure to comply. If he no
longer has an interest in the obligation or collateral at the time the request
is received he must disclose the name and address of any successor in
interest known to him and he is liable for any loss caused to the debtor as
6 American Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Helgesen, 64 Wash. 54, 116 Pac. 837 (1911).
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a result of failure to disclose. A successor in interest is not subject to
this section until a request is received by him.
(3) A debtor is entitled to such a statement once every six months
without charge. The secured party may require payment of a charge not
exceeding $10 for each additional statement furnished.
The general purpose of this section is to create a system which gives
the debtor a legal right to receive from the secured party a current
report of his obligation and the collateral. By amendment the Wash-
ington legislature added to the first sentence of section 9-208(1) the
phrase "or any other person whom he designates in writing to the
secured party." This change will require the secured party to transmit
the statement of obligation or collateral to a third person who comes
within the scope of the amendment. This change is implemented by
also changing the first part of the third sentence of section 9-208(2)
to read: "If the secured party without reasonable excuse fails to
comply he is liable for any loss caused to the debtor or such other
person as the debtor has designated as the recipient of such informa-
tion thereby;" and by changing the next to the last sentence of section
9-208(2) to read: "If he no longer has an interest in the obligation or
collateral at the time the request is received he must disclose the name
and address of any successor in interest known to him and he is liable
for any loss caused to the debtor or designated recipient of the infor-
mation as a result of failure to disclose."
This amendment illustrates consequences of deviation from uni-
formity in article 9. The section as enacted here is unique to Wash-
ington and will force finance companies and other types of financing
institutions which operate interstate to set up special Washington pro-
cedures for handling the transmission of reports to third persons. It
will be noted that each request for a statement must come from the
debtor. Some relief from the nuisance effect of broadening the range
of statement-recipients is afforded by section 9-208(3), which permits
the secured party to charge ten dollars for each statement after the
first one in each six-month period.
Section 9-310
The official text of this section reads:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services
or materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest, a lien
upon goods in the possession of such person given by statute or rule of
[VOL. 40 : 873
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law for such materials or services takes priority over a perfected security
interest unless the lien is statutory and the statute expressly provides
otherwise.
As enacted in Washington the section reads:
When a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes
services or materials with respect to goods subject to a security interest,
a lien upon goods in the possession of such person given by statute or rule
of law for such materials or services takes priority over a perfected secur-
ity interest only if the lien is statutory and the statute expressly provides
for such priority.
The underscored material is the changed part. Although there
appears to be no legislative history explaining the amendment it may
be surmised that the official text was found to conflict with the policy
of Washington Revised Code ch. 60.08 and of Washington Revised
Code ch. 60.56 as construed by the Washington court." The chattel
lien created by Washington Revised Code 60.08.010 is made subordi-
nate to an earlier and perfected security interest by Washington Re-
vised Code 60.08.030 without regard to possession. The official text
would have changed the operation of the agister's lien law, because
Washington Revised Code ch. 60.56 does not expressly provide for
priorities and the present priority of an earlier security interest results
from judicial construction.
Section 9-402
The official text of subsections (1) and (3) of this section reads:
(1) A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and
the secured party, gives an address of the secured party from which
information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a
mailing address of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the
types, or describing the items, of collateral. A financing statement may be
filed before a security agreement is made or a security interest otherwise
attaches. When the financing statement covers crops growing or to be
grown or goods which are or are to become fixtures, the statement must
also contain a description of the real estate concerned. A copy of the
security agreement is sufficient as a financing statement if it contains the
above information and is signed by both parties.
(3) A form substantially as follows is sufficient to comply with sub-
section (1):
7 Levitch v. Link, 95 Wash. 639, 164 Pac. 233 (1917).
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Name of debtor (or assignor)... .................
Address ......................................... ........
Name of secured party (or assignee) ...
A ddress . .... ....... .................... .. ........................
1. This financing statement covers the following types (or items) of
property:
(Describe) ........................ .............
2. (If collateral is crops) The above described crops are growing or
are to be grown on:
(Describe Real Estate)
3. (If collateral is goods which are or are to become fixtures) The
above described goods are affixed or to be affixed to:
(D escribe R eal E state) ................................................ .......
4. (If proceeds or products of collateral are claimed)
Proceeds-Products of the collateral are also covered.
Signature of Debtor (or Assignor) .........................
Signature of Secured Party (or Assignee) ................................
It will be-observed that section 9-402(1) states in substantive terms
what a financing statement shall contain, while section 9-402 (3) states
that the indicated forms will suffice.
The legislature amended section 9-402 (1) by adding a requirement
that the financing statement indicate the debtor's chief place of busi-
ness, the maximum amount of indebtedness, and the terms of repay-
ment.
These changes in section 9-402(1) were particularly harmful to the
principle of uniformity. They also made the over-all meaning of the
subsection unclear. The governor vetoed them.
Uniformity among the states is especially important in the statutory
regulation of the forms required for accomplishing perfection by filing.
It should be possible to develop forms which can be used with assur-
ance in any UCC jurisdiction. The amendment not only destroyed
uniformity, but also added three technical requirements which would
have been difficult to satisfy beyond the risk of controversy. Any
debtor, whether individual, partnership or corporate, who did business
in more than one place would have presented the draftsman of a financ-
ing statement with the necessity for selecting the appropriate place and
with an opportunity to make a mistake.
A statement of the maximum amount of the indebtedness would have
been a meaningless formality so far as actually informing a record
searcher is concerned. A well-advised draftsman would have stated a
[ VOL. 40 : 873
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
figure large enough to cover any contingency. Ordinary transactions
would probably have called for a routine statement of "One million
dollats" and larger ones for a statement of "Ten million dollars." In
short, the demand served no useful commercial purpose. It did create
a trap for the unwary. A secured party not informed of this totally
new kind of legal requirement might easily have made a mistake in
preparing his financing statement, and so have created doubt about
the effectiveness of his filing.
A requirement that the financing statement "specify the terms of
repayment" would have made section 9-402(1) hopelessly ambiguous.
This subsection creates a notice type of filing system--one which con-
templates the filing either of the security agreement or of a simple
form which apprises third persons that security transactions may be
entered into between the parties as to certain collateral or types of
collateral. It expressly states that "A financing statement may be filed
before a security agreement is made or a security interest otherwise
attaches." Much of, the substantive fabric of the statute, particularly
sections 9-203, 9-204, 9-303 and 9-306, contemplates the development
and use of financing which extends over the life of a business transac-
tion, which is documented at or before the beginning stage of the trans-
action, and which goes on the public records at that time.
In addition to the inherent vice in a requirement that the terms of
repayment be stated in the financing statement, there is manifest diffi-
culty in satisfying the demand with the assurance requisite to a filing
system. The phrase "specifies the terms of repayment" is itself unclear
and imprecise. Specifies as to what date? What of extensions of time
or of modifications? What of future advances? What of acceleration
clauses? These are only some of the questions the draftsman would
have been obliged to ask-and for which certain answers would not
have been obtainable.
This amendment of section 9-402(1) would have had serious r'ever-
berations in many directions. It would have created doubt about the
perfection of innumerable security interests, and would have caused
a monumental amount of controversy. Section 9-402 (3) was amended
to conform with the amendment of section 9-402 (1), with an additional
change which would have made section 9-402(3) ambiguous. The
governor vetoed the amendment of section 9-402 (3).
In addition to the changes in section 9-402(3) conforming that sub-
section to the amendment of section 9-402(1), the amendment of sec-
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tion 9-402(3) added "timber" to the categories of collateral which
require a financing statement identifying the land. Since section
9-402 (1) contains no such requirement, this passage was ambiguous.
The amendment also deleted all reference in section 9-402(3) to
fixtures. The end result of the amendment and the veto is a subsection
without subparagraph 3 of the official text, which refers to fixtures.
Section 9-402 (1), however, is the section which provides the substan-
tive coverage. It can be satisfied only by a financing statement which,
as to fixtures, identifies the land. The danger is that a secured party
will proceed on the basis of section 9-402 (3), which says nothing about
fixtures, overlooking section 9-402(1), and thus get into trouble.
The amendment and the veto also leave section 9-402(3) with
changes in wording and organization which will necessitate careful
study and rearranging by persons from other states who more com-
monly work with the official text.
Section 9-501(1)
This subsection states the basic remedies provision of the statute,
and is supplemented by the sections which follow it. The Washington
legislature added a paragraph to section 9-501(1), reading:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Code, in the case of a
purchase money security interest in consumer goods taken or retained by
the seller of such collateral to secure all or part of its price, the debtor
shall not be liable for any deficiency after the secured party has disposed
of such collateral under Section 9-504 or has retained such collateral in
satisfaction of the debt under subsection (2) of Section 9-505.
The effect of this amendment is to make a secured party, whose col-
lateral secured purchase money, liable to account for a surplus if he
repossesses the goods and sells them pursuant to section 9-504, but
deprives him of all right to a deficiency if he proceeds under section
9-504. There was no counterpart in the prior practice for so drastic a
rule. Under the election principle as it was earlier stated by the Wash-
ington court, a conditional sale vendor (but not a purchase money
mortgagee) had to choose between taking the property or pursuing his
money claim but if he chose the former remedy he was not obliged to
account for any excess in the value of the property above the debt
balance.8 In the prior practice a chattel mortgagee, whether the secured
obligation resulted from a sale or from a loan, could not repossess the
8 The latest of the election-rule decisions is Washington Co-op. Chick Ass'n v.
Jacobs, 42 Wn.2d 460, 256 P.2d 294 (1953).
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collateral.' He could combine an action to foreclose with an action on
the obligation and so obtain a deficiency judgment. 0
Section 9-505 (2) creates a procedure by which the collateral can be
taken in lieu of the obligation and the reference to this subsection in
the amendment is redundant.
The limitation on remedies imposed by the amendment is a good deal
less sweeping than appears at first encounter. UCC section 9-501(1)
expressly states that a secured party "may reduce his claim to judg-
ment, foreclose or otherwise enforce the security interest by any avail-
able judicial procedure."
The amendment is practically operative only where out-of-court
realization methods are followed under section 9-504 (by a secured
party who "has taken possession" presumably under section 9-503).
If the secured party is willing to undertake the delay and expense
entailed in a foreclosure action combined with an action on the debt
he can obtain a deficiency judgment. Although Washington Revised
Code ch. 61.08, which was concerned with foreclosure of chattel mort-
gages, has been repealed, the Superior Courts of Washington have
inherent equity jurisdiction including jurisdiction to foreclose a secur-
ity interest.
There is still another route by which a deficiency judgment can be
obtained. The amendment added to section 9-501 (1) leaves unaffected
the procedure authorized by section 9-501 (5), which reads:
When a secured party has reduced his claim by judgment the lien of
any levy which may be made upon his collateral by virtue of any execution
based upon the judgment shall relate back to the date of the perfection of
the security interest in such collateral. A judicial sale, pursuant to such
execution, is a foreclosure of the security interest by judicial procedure
within the meaning of this section, and the secured party may purchase at
the sale and thereafter hold the collateral free of any other requirements
of this Article.
Under this section the secured party's security-interest priority in
the collateral extends to the lien obtained by levy on the property
which constitutes the collateral, the execution and levy procedure serv-
ing as a kind of foreclosure. See comment 6, section 9-501. Since the
judgment will be discharged only to the extent that the execution sale
yields payment, a levy can be made against other assets in the event
of a deficiency.
9 Roche Fruit & Produce Co. v. Vaught, 143 Wash. 601, 255 Pac. 953 (1927).1 oWAsH. REv. CoDE § 61.12.070; Lassen v. Curtis, 40 Wn.2d 82, 241 P.2d 210 (1952).
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